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Abstract
Interest groups are key intermediary actors between civil society and public officials. The EU has long
emphasized the importance of interacting with representative groups that involve their members.
Additionally, there is an increasing trend toward the professionalization of groups that invest in organi-
zational capacities to efficiently provide policy expertise. Both member involvement and organizational
capacity are crucial features for groups to function as transmission belts that aggregate and transfer
the preferences of their members to policymakers, thus reinforcing the legitimacy and efficiency of gover-
nance systems. Yet, not all groups have these organizational attributes. This paper quantitatively examines
the effects of interest groups’ investment in member involvement and organizational capacity on the level
of access to EU Commission officials. The results indicate that member involvement does not pay off in
terms of higher levels of access. In contrast, groups with high organizational capacities have more meetings
with public officials of the Commission.
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Introduction
Interest groups are considered as key intermediary organizations that transmit the demands
of their constituencies to public officials (Kohler-Koch, 2010; Rasmussen et al., 2014). To truly
function as transmission belts, interest groups should be able to involve their members as well
as have the organizational capacity to ensure an efficient articulation of policy input to public
officials. Transmission belts, interest groups characterized by these two abilities, are believed
to be better suited to contribute to legitimate and efficient governance systems (Saurugger,
2008; Kohler-Koch and Buth, 2013). This is particularly relevant for the European Union.
Due to its democratic deficit and its limited resources, the European Commission is in need
of representative and organizationally capable groups that can efficiently provide valuable policy
input, thus fostering input and output legitimacy (European Commission, 2001, 2002, 2017,
p. 380). However, the dual function of membership involvement and organizational capacity
is mostly assumed or taken as a normative point of view, rather than being empirically tested.
The literature tends to obscure such central organizational functions by relying on proxies, such
as group type, which cannot be equaled to the actual capacity of groups to connect members with
public officials (Binderkrantz, 2009; Klüver and Saurugger, 2013; Baggetta and Madsen, 2018).
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To address this gap, this paper develops a novel theoretical framework to examine how the
ability of groups to involve their members and professionally provide policy input shapes their
level of access to public officials of the European Commission. In doing so, this paper examines
whether the rhetoric of the Commission, which highly values the representative nature of groups,
also translates into higher levels of access for groups that meet these expectations, rather than
prioritizing interactions with professionalized groups with more expert-oriented structures.
Additionally, the paper unveils whether those groups that overcome the organizational tensions
between representing members and professionally meeting demands from public officials
(Schmitter and Streeck, 1999; Berkhout et al., 2017), and thus approximate the transmission belt
ideal, gain higher levels of access to public officials of the Commission. If interest groups are one of
the tools to redress the so-called democratic deficit at the EU level (Kohler-Koch and Buth, 2013;
Kröger, 2016), it is necessary to open the black box and examine the effects of involving members
and having organizational capacity on the level of access to the Commission.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, it builds upon previous work stressing
the relevance of how groups are internally organized and the significant variation in that regard
(Minkoff et al., 2008; Baroni et al., 2014; Fraussen, 2014; Halpin et al., 2018) by highlighting two
critical functions of groups: member involvement for representation and organizational capacity
to efficiently provide policy input. Second, by examining the effects of having representative and
efficient structures on the number of meetings with EU officials, the paper contributes to the literature
centered on interest groups’ level of access to public officials (Binderkrantz and Christiansen, 2015;
Fraussen et al., 2015; Rasmussen and Gross, 2015; Grömping and Halpin, 2019; Weiler et al., 2019).
Third, the paper provides an evaluation of the democratic potential of policy insider groups, which is
crucial to assess how governance systems function. That is, the paper moves forward the debate on
interest group bias by exploring whether membership groups that are more able to represent their
constituency in an efficient and professional way gain more access to EU officials.
The paper relies on survey data from 196 groups with access to the Commission and that
responded to the INTEREURO Interest Group Survey (Bernhagen et al., 2016; Beyers et al.,
2016). The results indicate that the organizational capacity to efficiently generate and provide
policy input matters for gaining higher levels of access to Commission officials. In contrast, investing
in democratic structures does not seem to result in higher levels of access. Finally, investing in both
organizational dimensions, and thus functioning as a transmission belt, does not relate to higher lev-
els of access. These findings and their important implications for the functioning of the European
Commission and the democratic character of the EU are further discussed in the final section.
Explaining degree of access through an organizational approach
This paper focuses on interest groups with access – which is conceptualized as an exchange
mechanism whereby groups offer resources to public officials in exchange for meetings
(Binderkrantz and Pedersen, 2017; Halpin and Fraussen, 2017). By focusing on ‘insider’
organizations, the paper scrutinizes an under-researched yet important aspect of interest
groups – public officials’ interaction, namely, the organizational factors that explain the degree
of access within the set of groups that (regularly) interact with public officials (Fraussen et al.,
2015). As posed by Maloney et al. (1994, p. 25), ‘access merely leads to consultation, while
privileged access leads to bargaining and negotiation.’ More importantly, among those groups
with (regular) access to public officials, few manage to achieve a privileged status by securing
and frequently getting direct access to public officials, while the large majority occupy a peripheral
insider position (Maloney et al., 1994, p. 17). Grossmann (2012, pp. 95–96) also highlights the
importance of studying ‘insider’ organizations by stating that ‘if 5% of organizations account for half
of all participation, for example, researchers must cover that 5% to understand the
dynamics of the advocacy groups that are involved in policymaking.’ In other words, it is important
to examine why some groups seldom meet with public officials, while others gain frequent access.
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Previous studies focusing on the level of access of interest groups have found that economic
groups enjoy more access in administrative venues than citizen groups (Binderkrantz and
Christiansen, 2015; Fraussen et al., 2015; Weiler et al., 2019). Rasmussen and Gross (2015,
p. 358) also show that specialist groups have higher levels of access to advisory groups of
the EU than diffused interest groups. While focusing on interest business associations,
Kohler-Koch et al. (2017) find that representativeness (in terms of membership density) favors
higher degrees of groups’ reported access to the Commission and the European Parliament.
Similarly, a recent research shows that the European representativeness and the organizational
structure of European associations are related with access to administrative and political officials
of the EU (Albareda and Braun, 2019). Finally, groups that invest more in member engagement
receive positive benefits by way of a higher degree of access in the legislative arena (Grömping and
Halpin, 2019) and are more likely to be political insiders (Heylen et al., 2020).
Yet, we still have scant knowledge on whether involving members as well as having profession-
alized organizational features leads to higher levels of access to Commission officials. There has
been little conceptual work on the possible relationship among interest groups’ organizational
structure, their capacity to function as transmission belts, and the level of access to public officials
they enjoy. To address this gap, this study conceptualizes the transmission belt ideal by focusing
on the organizational ability of groups to involve members and have organizational capacity, and
examines its effects on the level of access to Commission officials.
The conceptualization of transmission belts developed here applies to membership-based
interest groups, as they are expected to have a representative role that one would not
assume – or that is at least more complicated – for non-membership organizations
(Schlozman et al., 2015). More specifically, membership-based interest groups are expected to
promote a legitimate representation through processes of authorization and accountability
between members and representatives. Thus, groups with members require a link to a social
constituency that needs to be involved in the development of policy positions (Kröger, 2016,
pp. 9–10).
The next sections present a detailed discussion of how the combination of certain organiza-
tional attributes contribute to fostering member involvement or organizational capacity and their
relationship with level of access. The main expectation is that groups that invest in member
involvement and organizational capacity – and approximate the transmission belt ideal – are able
to provide a wider set of policy goods and, thus, are expected to gain higher levels of access to
public officials.
Member involvement
Member involvement relates to those organizational features that are aimed at connecting, engag-
ing, and interacting with members, while ensuring that the group reflects members’ preferences
and information. This organizational dimension speaks to the idea of representation capacity,
defined as the ability of groups to speak on behalf of their members (Flöthe, 2019b). Groups
that intend to foster their intermediate role are expected to have organizational mechanisms that
connect them with their membership base. By doing so, they are better prepared to generate clear
and authoritative statements of the political interests of the constituency they represent
(Grömping and Halpin, 2019, p. 515). To achieve this, interest groups need to exhibit a gover-
nance and decision-making structure that is representative of their members and ensure that
their actions reflect the shared interest of their membership base (Jordan and Maloney, 2007;
Kohler-Koch, 2010).
This paper focuses on three elements that have been considered as crucial for member involve-
ment and, thus, for the representative capacity of groups (Berkhout et al., 2017; Albareda, 2018).
First, the mere existence of a forum where members and leaders of the group meet is key for
member involvement, social integration, and democracy (Hayes, 1986; Jordan and Maloney,
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2007, p. 2). The second element revolves around the decision-making system and the capacity of
members to determine positions and strategies of the group (Binderkrantz, 2009). In Berry et al.’s
(1993) terms, involving members in the decision-making system is about the depth of participa-
tion and is expected to ensure an active involvement in the group (see also, Beyers, 2008). Finally,
an important element to maintain the connection with the members is the existence of local
offices, branches, or regional chapters. This feature not only enhances the embeddedness of
the group in society (Fraussen et al., 2015, p. 574), but also ensures a smooth communication
(and the provision of information) from geographically dispersed members to the group
(Skocpol, 2003; Fraussen et al., 2015). In sum, these three factors foster the involvement of mem-
bers in the group and enhance their democratic nature (Jordan and Maloney, 2007, pp. 9–10).
Interest groups that invest in member involvement are expected to have more access to public
officials of the Commission. One the one hand, Commission officials are in need of input legiti-
macy that can be provided by representative interest groups. In that regard, as clearly posed by
Kohler-Koch (2010, p. 101), ‘those who want to participate in (EU) policymaking have to prove
that they are representative.’ The Commission itself has stated that when interest groups want to
meet EU officials, ‘it must be apparent (1), which interest they represent, and (2) how inclusive
that representation is’ (European Commission, 2002, p. 17). Similarly, the White Paper on
Governance (2001), ‘raised the prospect of privileged “extended partnership arrangements” in
return for those groups, which could provide it with evidence of representativity’ (Greenwood,
2007, p. 346; see also Persson and Edholm, 2018, p. 561). According to this EU rhetoric, those
groups that have most of the organizational elements linked to member involvement will be more
capable of offering input legitimacy and, thus, will have more access to the Commission. On the
other hand, following an exchange approach (Bouwen, 2002), public officials are expected to grant
higher levels of access to groups investing in member involvement, because they are more likely
to have political information and implementation capacity. More specifically, through member
involvement, groups are better able to understand and represent all members’ viewpoints, expe-
riences, and grievances (Kohler-Koch, 2010; Flöthe, 2019a). Moreover, the close-knit relationship
between members and the group fosters membership compliance and, thus, implementation
capacity (Braun, 2012).
Hypothesis 1: The more an interest group invests in member involvement, the more likely it is
that it will gain higher degrees of access to Commission officials.
Organizational capacity
Organizational capacity relates to those organizational elements that enable groups to act in an
efficient and professional manner while internally generating expertise-based information. The
main assumption related to this understanding of organizational capacity is that effectiveness
of interest groups is about their ability to interact with public officials. Alternative approaches
to interest groups effectiveness – such as the ability to implement outside lobbying strategies
(Maloney et al., 1994) – might require different organizational attributes that are not considered
here (see Bryan, 2019 for a discussion on the contingent nature of organizational capacity).
However, the conceptualization of organizational capacity developed below allows us to assess
the ability of groups to supply timely and detailed responses to public officials with limited resour-
ces and under time constraints (Klüver, 2012; Klüver and Saurugger, 2013; Maloney, 2015).
To build this organizational capacity, groups need to invest in three key organizational features:
autonomy, centralized structures, and the functional differentiation that facilitates the generation
of policy expertise (Albareda, 2018; Hanegraaff et al., 2019, p. 7; Klüver, 2012).
Autonomy, understood as the delegation of discretionary authority to the group, enhances
managerial flexibility and efficiency (Bach, 2014, p. 345). Autonomous groups are supposed to
have control over operational activities and, thus, are better equipped to function independently
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and pursue long-term strategies (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999; Beyers et al., 2008) while overcom-
ing the hurdles of collaborative endeavors. Second, centralization or hierarchical integration
implies the concentration of power on a limited number of top representatives of the group.
This feature facilitates the coordination of the different tasks and activities of the group
(Christensen et al., 2016). Empowering the top representatives of the organization is part of
the managerialist trend that many groups have undergone and that aims to promote effective
and efficient structures (Skocpol, 2003; Maloney, 2015). Finally, functional differentiation refers
to the presence of specialized units that generate policy expertise on concrete issues (Hage and
Aiken, 1967; Klüver, 2012). As highlighted by Klüver (2012, p. 496), groups with functional
differentiation are better fitted to monitor the behavior of public officials and to notice the emer-
gence of new policy initiatives at early stages, which enable these groups to develop expert-based
information demanded by public officials. In sum, organizational capacity implies that groups are
capable of generating policy expertise and efficiently processing and transferring their own resour-
ces to public officials.
Groups that invest in organizational capacity are expected to have higher degrees of access
to Commission officials. Given the limited time, resources, and capacity of Commission officials
as well as the transaction costs associated with meeting many stakeholders, public officials
would rather meet with capable groups that have expertise and that are able to timely respond
to policymakers’ demands (Klüver, 2012). On the one hand, expert knowledge and technical
information internally generated by specialized units are an important access good particularly
for Commission officials who, as legislative agenda-setters and to develop effective policies, are
in need of expert and technical information (Bouwen, 2002, 2004; Greenwood, 2011; De
Bruycker, 2016). In that regard, knowledge and expertise are key sources of Commission (output)
legitimacy (Kröger, 2016). On the other hand, as noted by Rasmussen and Toshkov (2013, p. 382),
responsiveness of public authorities is not simply about ‘giving the public what it wants but also
about providing such outputs in a timely fashion.’ Accordingly, public officials are expected to
favor the interaction with those groups that can efficiently offer valuable information about
an issue. Additionally, the emergence of capable organizations can be seen as a response of
the lobbying community to EU ‘pressure on interest groups to organize themselves coherently
to be able to present their demands in a professional and constructive way’ (Klüver and
Saurugger, 2013, p. 186). Thus, when investing in organizational capacity features, interest groups
are expected to gain more frequent meetings with public officials.
Hypothesis 2: The more an interest group invests in organizational capacity, the more likely it is
that it will gain higher degrees of access to Commission officials.
Transmission belts
The ability to function as a transmission belt is related to the presence of organizational attributes
that, on the one hand, foster the interaction and engagement with members and, on the other
hand, promote the efficiency of the group by acting professionally and generating expertise-based
information demanded by public officials. The paper contends that groups with an internal struc-
ture that approximates the transmission belt ideal fit better than others within the EU context,
and, thus, will gain more access to public officials of the Commission. As noted before, the
Commission has repeatedly stated its preferences for interacting with groups that can truly speak
on behalf of their constituency (European Commission, 2001, 2002, 2017; Kohler-Koch and Buth,
2013). At the same time, previous investigations demonstrate that the population of groups
mobilized at the EU level is becoming highly professionalized, a factor that is also expected to
positively influence their ability to gain access to the Commission (Klüver and Saurugger,
2013; Maloney, 2015). In other words, groups that invest in member involvement and organiza-
tional capacity are expected to approximate the transmission belt ideal and successfully function
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as intermediaries between their constituency and public officials, thereby contributing to EU
governance systems with input and output legitimacy.
However, having most of the organizational elements of both dimensions may be associated
with organizational tensions. Interest groups struggle to combine organizational features that
reinforce the democratic nature of groups by involving members, with other features aimed at
being efficient and at generating policy expertise (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999; Jordan and
Maloney, 2007; Skocpol, 2003; Klüver and Saurugger, 2013; Maloney, 2015; Berkhout et al.,
2017). As noted by van der Pijl and Sminia (2004)), these two organizational dimensions are
in conflict, because one follows a bottom-up process that emphasizes the inclusion of all the
different voices within the organization whereas the other follows a top-down approach that relies
on values such as efficiency and control over members. Functioning as a transmission belt, thus,
puts substantial and sometimes contradictory organizational demands on groups (Berkhout et al.,
2017). However, some groups are able to overcome these tensions and effectively organize
themselves as transmission belts (Albareda, 2018). These groups are not only able to provide
public officials with input legitimacy, but also function in an efficient and professional manner,
which reinforces the output legitimacy of the political process. Hence, groups that invest in both
organizational dimensions will have higher levels of access than those that only invest in one
of them.
Hypothesis 3a: Interest groups organized as transmission belts are more likely to gain higher
degrees of access to Commission officials than those that are not organized as
transmission belts.
Hypothesis 3b: The effects of functioning as a transmission belt on the likelihood of gaining more
access to the Commission are higher than the one obtained by interest groups
investing in either member involvement or organizational capacity.
Research design
The paper relies on data from the INTEREURO Interest Group Survey,1 a tool designed within the
INTEREURO project to examine organizational characteristics and policy activities of interest
groups active at the EU level. The survey was conducted from 9 March to 2 July 2015 and targeted
senior leaders of the interest groups (Bernhagen et al., 2016). In total, 2038 interest organizations
were selected from the Transparency Register of the EU, the OECKL Directory.2 To be included in
the sample, the organizations had to fulfil three requirements: (1) EU-level interest organizations,
which could be EU peak associations or national organizations with (2) a presence in Brussels and
(3) that show some interest in EU policymaking processes. The organizations included in the sam-
ple fit perfectly the purpose of this study, because, due to their layered structure, they require to
put in place a certain organizational structure that defines the interaction between members. The
last section of the paper discusses how the focus on interest groups active at the EU level may have
consequences for the occurrence of our explanatory factors and, thus, for the generalizability of
the results.
Despite the hurdles related to gaining organizational data of interest groups (Baggetta and
Madsen, 2018), 738 groups completed the questionnaire, reaching a response rate of 36.2%
(Beyers et al., 2016). To enable the identification of group type (i.e. business vs. non-business
groups), only membership-based groups that were accurately categorized are included. Groups
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groups without members (n= 48) have been dropped from the database, leading to 559 interest
groups for which survey data are available.
The bottom-up sampling approach used to obtain the sample of groups included in the survey
entails an important limitation, namely, that it does not represent a perfect match for studies on
interest group influence due to the long chain of intermediate steps between mobilization and final
policy outcomes (Berkhout et al., 2018). However, this dataset of 559 groups is combined with the
‘Transparency International EU – Integrity Watch’ database of interest groups with access to pub-
lic officials of the Commission – i.e. Commissioners, their Cabinets, and Director-Generals
(European Commission, 2014).3 In total, 196 out of the 559 membership-based groups that
responded to the INTEREURO survey had at least one meeting with public officials between
December 2014 and October 2017.
Dependent variable: access to public officials of the European Commission
The hypotheses drawn in the previous section are tested by focusing on the level of access that
interest groups obtain to Commission officials. Since the approval of the White Paper on
European Governance in 2001, the Commission has been progressively developing ‘one of the
most elaborate and ambitious consultative regimes’ (Bunea, 2017, p. 47). At a general level,
the consultation regime of the EU aims to promote a balanced involvement and participation
of different non-state stakeholders, to reinforce the societal legitimacy of EU institutions, and
to efficiently and effectively develop legislative proposals by interacting with actors that will be
affected and that possess relevant knowledge (European Commission, 2001; Kröger, 2016, p.
27). To do so, the Commission has put in place multiple consultation mechanisms, both open
and targeted (European Commission, 2017; Fraussen et al., 2020).
This paper focuses on one specific consultation mechanism, namely, direct – face-to-face and
often individual – meetings between interest group representatives and public officials of the
Commission. Importantly, there is no clear set of rules defining which groups are invited to
the meetings studied here (Kröger, 2016, p. 25). However, direct meetings constitute an important
form of access, as they are expected to have the highest degree of interactivity and involvement
between officials and group representatives when compared with other public and targeted con-
sultation mechanisms (European Commission, 2017, pp. 395–396).
To examine the relationship between degree of access and the presence of key organizational
features related to the transmission belt ideal, the paper only includes groups that had at least one
meetings with a Commission official between December 2014 and October 2017, and measures
the degree of access by the number of meetings they had in this period. By focusing on level of
access, this paper intends to capture which organizational dimensions facilitate a repeated inter-
action with public officials and, thus, can get a status closer to what has been labelled as ‘core’
insiders (Fraussen et al., 2015). Additionally, this operationalization of the dependent variable
accounts for the limited knowledge that public officials may have about interest groups’ organi-
zational structures. It is fair to assume that public officials do not know whether groups invest in
member involvement and/or organizational capacity. However, this is probably clarified after the
first meeting, and thus, if involving members or having organizational capacity matters, it can be
observed with the subsequent meetings between the group and public officials. Despite this focus
on groups with access, the paper also includes additional analyses that examine the effects of the
explanatory variables on the likelihood of gaining access. In this case, the variable is either 0 or 1.
These analyses include the 559 membership-based groups that responded to the INTEREURO
survey of which 35% gained access to Commission officials in the specified period.
3The data are offered in an aggregate manner by Transparency International – Integrity Watch. See: http://www.
integritywatch.eu/about.html
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Explanatory factors: member involvement, organizational capacity, and transmission belts
Table 1 presents the operationalization of the two organizational dimensions. Member involve-
ment is an additive index that includes the following organizational features: interaction among
members, decision-making procedure, and the presence of local branches. The first item focuses
on the presence or absence of a forum that facilitates the interaction among members or support-
ers (Hayes, 1986; Jordan and Maloney, 2007). Despite being a restricted operationalization that
does not account for the frequency of these meetings or their turnout, the presence of such a
forum is considered as a prerequisite to enable the interaction among members and between
members and the organization (Jordan and Maloney, 2007, p. 2). The second feature looks at
the decision-making procedure and, in particular, at whether members have the capacity to
determine the positions and strategies of the group either through consensus or voting mecha-
nisms (Binderkrantz, 2009). This measurement is about the depth of participation of members
regarding key factors for the mission and the future of the organization (Berry et al., 1993)
and relates to the perceived legitimacy that members confer to the group (Persson et al.,
2013). The last item centers on the presence or absence of local branches that foster the connec-
tions between the group and its local/regional constituency (Skocpol, 2003; Fraussen et al., 2015).
That is, it looks at the organizational ability of the group to reach out to elementary members
spread around a Member State, Europe, or even internationally.
Organizational capacity is an additive index of three organizational elements: autonomy, cen-
tralization, and functional differentiation. Autonomy is measured using a question about whether
the group can independently hire their own staff and approve the budget or if, in contrast, both
tasks require the approval of the members (either directly or through the board of directors)
(Bach, 2014). That is, the focus is on operational autonomy, which, in this case, indicates whether
a group can take human resource management decisions without membership involvement.
As noted by Bach (2014, p. 345), this is a powerful indicator of the ‘degree of [member] interfer-
ence in the day-to-day management of the [group].’ Centralization is operationalized as a con-
struct that captures whether the apex of the group (i.e. executive director, the chair of the board,
and the board of directors) is influential when establishing positions and deciding on advocacy
tactics (Christensen et al., 2016). The paper, thus, examines real authority, which is expected to
provide a more accurate measurement, because some organizations may have decentralized
decision-making structures, but, in practice, the power/influence might be concentrated around
the apex of the organization (Pugh et al., 1963). Finally, functional differentiation is measured by
examining the presence or absence of committees for specific tasks (Hage and Aiken, 1967), which
enable the organization to produce expert knowledge in a timely manner (Klüver, 2012).
The items in each organizational dimension serve to compute two additive multi-dimensional
factors (or composites) that range from 0 to 3 (see Berkhout et al., 2017 for a similar approach). In
doing so, the paper establishes two composite factors that are formed when ‘individual indicators
are compiled into a single index on the basis of an underlying model of the multi-dimensional
concept that is being measured’ (Greco et al., 2019). In this case, the (non-weighted) three items
included in each factor are conceptually related, but they represent different organizational
dimensions, and, thus, are not statistically correlated (see Table A0 in Appendix I). For more
details on the original questions used to operationalize each of the items and the correlation
between them, see Appendix I.
The third explanatory variable – i.e. the organizational ability to function as a transmission
belt – is operationalized as a binary factor that is coded as 1 when groups score 2 or 3 in both
‘member involvement’ and ‘organizational capacity.’ In other words, those interest groups that
score highly on both organizational dimensions are coded as a transmission belt. This operation-
alization follows an organizational configuration approach and considers transmission belts those
interest groups that have at least two critical organizational features related to each organizational
dimension (for a similar operationalization of the transmission belt factor, see Berkhout et al.,
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2017, p. 1118). An alternative would be operationalizing this variable as an additive index
of the two organizational dimensions, that is, ranging from 0 to 6, but the problem with this
approach is that it does not enable us to examine how the presence of both dimensions affects
levels of access. Similarly, studying this variable as an interaction effect between the two organi-
zational dimensions would not allow us to disentangle which groups can be categorized as trans-
mission belts.
Control variables
The paper controls for well-established variables that tap into groups’ characteristics and that
relate to their capacity to provide different access goods to public officials. The first control is
group type. It is included as a dichotomous variable indicating whether groups are business
(e.g. European Dairy Association or the International Union of Combined Road-Rail
Transport Companies) or non-business (e.g. European Consumer Organization or the
European Federation of Employees in Public Services). Business groups are expected to be better
represented in administrative venues such as the Commission (e.g. Fraussen et al., 2015;
Kohler-Koch et al., 2017; Weiler et al., 2019). Moreover, recent research has demonstrated that
business organizations face more difficulties than citizen groups when establishing policy posi-
tions on specific policy issues, which implies that they have a more active involvement of their
members (De Bruycker et al., 2019). Related, the correlation matrix in Appendix II shows that
business organizations are more likely to approximate the transmission belt ideal, and thus,
it is important to control for this in the multivariate models.
The second control distinguishes whether organizations are mobilized at a national or supra-
national level (Bunea, 2014). Aligned with previous studies, the Commission is expected to favor
Table 1 Operationalization of organizational variables
Items Operationalization
Member involvement: Additive index ranging from 0 to 3
Interaction among members 0=Organizations do not have a general assembly or
an annual general meeting.
1= Organizations have a general assembly or an
annual general meeting.
Decision-making procedure 0=Members do not participate in the decision-making
processes when establishing positions and defining
strategies.
1=Members participate in the decision-making
processes when establishing positions and defining
strategies.
Local branches 0=Organizations do not have local or regional
chapters.
1= Organizations have local or regional chapters.
Organizational capacity: Additive index ranging from 0 to 3
Autonomy 0= The senior staff of the organization does not have
decision-making power on the budget or on hiring
staff.
1= The senior staff of the organization has decision-
making power on the budget and on hiring staff.
Centralization 0= The apex of the group is not influential when
establishing positions and defining strategies.
1= The apex of the group is influential when
establishing positions and defining strategies.
Functional differentiation 0=Organizations do not have committees for specific
tasks.
1= Organizations have committees for specific tasks.
Prioritizing Professionals? 493
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773920000247
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Library Erasmus University Rotterdam, on 17 Dec 2020 at 13:08:38, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
the interaction with groups representing encompassing interests that go beyond their national
preferences (Bouwen, 2004; Bunea, 2014). Third, the scope of activity of the group – measured
with the number of policy domains or sectors in which the group is involved – is included as a
control. Here, the distinction is between generalists and niche players, and the formers are
expected to have more access to the Commission, because they are active in more policy domains.
Fourth, membership diversity is included as a count variable to assess the effect of having a diverse
set of members on degree of access. The membership options are: private citizens, firms, local and
regional governments, national associations, and European associations.
Organizational age and resources are also included as controls. In line with previous studies,
organizational age is expected to have a positive effect on the level of access to public officials,
because older groups may have more expertise to engage in lobbying and a wider circle of contacts
among public officials (Dür and Mateo, 2014; Fraussen et al., 2015). The financial resources of the
organizations are measured in terms of full-time equivalents (FTE) and are expected to positively
relate with access (Dür and Mateo, 2014; Kröger, 2016, p. 187). Although resources on their own
cannot fully explain why groups get engaged in EU politics, they may have an effect on interest
groups’ abilities to involve their members and develop the necessary organizational capacities to
efficiently engage with public officials (Kröger 2016, p. 188). Yet, as reported in the correlation
matrix in Appendix II, the variable resources are not correlated with the explanatory factors, sug-
gesting that ‘resources cannot explain why we find different patterns of organizational structures
among groups’ (Hollman, 2018).
Analyses and results
Before turning to the regression analyses, this paragraph describes the explanatory variables,
as well as the bivariate relationship between them and the dependent variable. First, groups
on average invest somewhat more in organizational capacity than in member involvement.
More specifically, as shown in Table A2 in Appendix II, groups score 1.486 (S.D. 0.643) and
1.787 (S.D. 0.481) for member involvement and organizational capacity, respectively. In addition,
37% of the interest groups in the analysis are organizationally prepared to function as transmis-
sion belts. Second, regarding the bivariate analysis, the three explanatory variables are positively
related to the degree of access interest groups gain to Commission officials. However, as shown in
the correlation matrix (Appendix II), the only variable that is significantly related to the degree of
access is organizational capacity.
Regarding the multivariate analyses, Table 2 presents the results of negative binomial regres-
sions that have as dependent variable the level of access, that is, the number of meetings with
public officials of the Commission. This is an appropriate method, because the dependent variable
is an over-dispersed count variable that ranges from 1 to 116, with a mean of 8.204, and a standard
deviation of 15.431 (Long and Freese, 2014).
First, Hypothesis 1 is rejected. Results in Models 1, 3, and 5 indicate that those groups that
invest in involving their members via direct contact and decision-making procedures are not more
likely to gain higher levels of access to the Commission. In fact, the predicted number of meetings
when groups do not have the organizational features that empower their members is 13.771 (SE:
7.964), and when groups have the three features related to member involvement, this decreases to
5.969 (SE: 2.757).4 This finding contradicts the rhetoric of the Commission and its request for
representative and democratic interest groups (European Commission, 2001, 2002). The non-
significant relation may be a consequence of the transaction and coordination costs associated
with involving members, which hamper the efficiency of the group and their ability to provide
timely and relevant policy input. The null finding also indicates that public officials are not
actively reaching out to those groups that are more representative of their membership base.
4The predicted number of meetings presented in the analyses is based on Model 5 of Table 2.
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Models 2, 3, and 5 confirm Hypothesis 2. Groups that have more organizational capacity are
more likely to gain more access to public officials of the Commission. The predicted number
of meetings with public officials increases from 2.055 (SE: 1.170) when groups do not have
any feature related to organizational capacity to 21.463 (SE: 8.552) and when they have the three
organizational attributes. This finding relates to the preference of EU institutions for developed
and professional organizations (Klüver and Saurugger, 2013; Maloney, 2015). Aligned with
previous findings, this result shows that investing in efficient and professionalized structures that
generate expertise-based information facilitates access to the Commission (Klüver, 2012; Berkhout
et al., 2017). More importantly, this finding underlines the agency of groups when gaining more
access to the Commission – organizationally capable groups have a clear advantage in that regard.
Finally, as depicted in Models 4 and 5, interest groups organized as transmission belts do not
have higher levels of access; thus, Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b, respectively, are rejected.
More specifically, 37% of the interest groups in the analysis that overcome the tensions of balanc-
ing member involvement and organizational capacity and, hence, that are expected to offer both
input legitimacy and efficiency do not have more access to public officials of the Commission. The
predicted number of meetings of groups that are not categorized as transmission belts is 7.927
meetings (SE: 1.835), whereas transmission belts have 9.820 (SE: 3.026). In that regard, being orga-
nizationally prepared to function as a transmission belt leads to more meetings, but this difference
is not statistically significant. Consequently, the relationship between interest group structure and
access is dominated by their investment in organizational capacity, whereas involving members
seems to decrease the ability or the attractiveness of groups to gain access to public officials.
Regarding the control variables in Model 5, being a generalist, mobilizing at the EU/
international level, and having more resources are positively related to the level of access. In con-
trast, groups including a more diverse set of actors are less likely to gain higher levels of access.
As shown by Kröger (2018), groups with a heterogeneous membership-base face more difficulties
to find common ground beyond the lowest common denominator, which ultimately might be
hampering their ability to be politically active. Another intriguing result is that group type does
not matter in any of the models. In contrast to other institutional settings, such as Belgium
(Fraussen et al., 2015), Denmark (Binderkrantz and Christiansen, 2015), and Switzerland
Table 2 Negative binomial regression: level of access to commission officials1
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Member involvement −0.010 (0.215) −0.150 (0.198) −0.279 (0.331)
Organizational capacity 0.861*** (0.229) 0.869*** (0.228) 0.782*** (0.292)
Transmission belt 0.302 (0.255) 0.214 (0.449)
Group type: Non-business
(REF)






0.7912** (0.378) 0.649* (0.361) 0.690* (0.363) 0.705* (0.376) 0.700* (0.363)
Scope of activity 0.117** (0.046) 0.092** (0.042) 0.095** (0.041) 0.116** (0.046) 0.100** (0.043)
Membership diversity −0.348*** (0.121) −0.332*** (0.113) −0.344*** (0.113) −0.310** (0.122) −0.335*** (0.115)
Organizational age −0.005 (0.005) −0.002 (0.005) −0.003 (0.005) −0.003 (0.006) −0.003 (0.005)
Resources (FTE) 0.009** (0.004) 0.008** (0.003) 0.008*** (0.003) 0.008** (0.004) 0.009*** (0.003)
Constant 1.488** (0.591) −0.006 (0.624) 0.155 (0.654) 1.258** (0.547) 0.361 (0.785)
N 107 107 107 107 107
Alpha 1.193 (0.163) 1.067 (0.150) 1.060 (0.150) 1.182 (0.162) 1.057 (0.150)
Log likelihood −329.659 −323.238 −322.954 −329.060 −322.841
* P< 0.1; ** P< 0.05; *** P< 0.01.
1The t-test analyses indicate that neither the dependent variable nor the main explanatory and control factors are biased due to missing data.
Vif scores in range from 1.06 to 4.12, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem.
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(Weiler et al., 2019), results indicate that, in the Commission, being a business organization does
not affect the level of access to public officials. One possible explanation of this null finding is the
time-consuming process of internal consensus formation that business organizations, particularly
at the EU level, necessitate to define policy positions (De Bruycker et al., 2019). All in all, the
results of the control variables underline the necessity to more accurately unpack the relationship
among membership diversity, group type, organizational structure, and access or influence.
Additional analyses and robustness tests
This paper focuses on explaining the degree of access that interest groups obtain to public officials.
However, access can be conceptualized as a two-step process in which first interest groups gain
access, and, subsequently, they can have repeated access. This section evaluates the robustness of
the results while accounting for those organizations without access. More specifically, Table 3
presents the results of hurdle negative binomial models, a two-step method that first assesses
the probability of obtaining the binary outcome, in this case obtaining access or not, and subse-
quently calculates the effects of the same explanatory factors on the level of access (see Weiler
et al., 2019 for a similar approach). This model is appropriate in the case of a sequential
decision-making process. Even though the two stages of granting access once and deciding to
grant access multiple times are estimated separately, the second stage should be interpreted as
conditional on the first stage.
The first step of the model (binary logit) shows that organizational capacity increases the
likelihood of gaining access. In contrast, member involvement and functioning as a transmission
belt are not related to the probability of gaining access.5 That is, the same organizational factors
that explain the level of access seem to explain the likelihood of gaining access. Additionally, the
second step of the model (zero-truncated negative binomial) confirms the results presented in
Table 2. The only differences are found in the significance levels of some control variables.
More specifically, the second step of hurdle models shows that only organizational scale and
resources are significantly related to the degree of access, yet this result is not consistent across
all model specifications in Table 3. Appendix III presents additional robustness checks that further
confirm the results reported in Tables 2 and 3.
Discussion and conclusions
This paper develops a novel theoretical approach to study how interest groups’ member involve-
ment and organizational capacity affect their degree of access to EU public officials. In this way,
the findings inform us about the potential democratic contribution of groups with access to
Commission officials – who are expected to reach out to groups that can increase the legitimacy
and efficiency of the policy process.
Before discussing the main findings, this last section will reflect on three aspects related to the
research design. First, this paper has analyzed how interest groups’ organizational structure affects
access using reported survey data that tap key organizational elements. Thus, the paper looks at
the formal opportunities for the participation of members, and not at the actual involvement of
members. In addition to examining actual involvement of members, future research could exam-
ine whether the organizational structures related to member involvement lead to an accurate
alignment of the preferences of members and the positions of group leaders (Kröger, 2016, 2018).
Second, the groups included in the sample are active at the EU level and gained access to
Commission officials. The need for professionalized and technical expertise might be accentuated
in the Commission, which as the bureaucratic institution in charge of developing policy proposals
5In total, 287 organizations have been excluded from the analysis due to missing values. The t-test analyses indicate that
neither the dependent variable nor the main explanatory and control factors are biased due to missing data.
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Table 3 Hurdle negative binomial: access and level of access to commission officials
Access Level of access
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is mostly concerned about the technicalities that would make a proposal viable. We may find
different results if we study more politicized venues, such as the legislative arena where there
is a higher demand for political knowledge (Grömping and Halpin, 2019). In addition, the effects
of these organizational dimensions and the ability to function as a transmission belt might work
differently at the national level (see Berkhout et al., 2017). In that regard, members might have few
selective incentives to get involved in the groups due to its EU focus, which could ultimately affect
the organizational attributes to involve members and have organizational capacity. Future
research needs to assess the occurrence and validity of the main explanatory factors and their
effects on the degree of access in (sub)national polities.
Finally, the paper focuses on the transmission belt function of membership-based interest
groups. That is, it excludes non-membership organizations which according to the
Transparency Register represent almost half of the interest groups with access to Commission
officials. The main argument to exclude these organizations is that they do not have the (implicit)
responsibility to take into account the concerns of members and to be representative of their
constituency. However, non-membership interest groups can develop important functions that
complement and support the representative role of membership-based interest groups (Walker
et al., 2011). Future research should delve into the relationship between membership and
non-membership-based groups to more accurately assess the transmission belt function.
Despite these limitations, the analyses demonstrate that the most important organizational di-
mension to gain more access to the Commission is organizational capacity. This finding goes
somewhat against the rhetoric of the Commission and its presumed willingness to interact with
representative groups to compensate for its democratic deficit and expand the societal legitimacy
of EU public policies (Kohler-Koch, 2010). Contrary to what is expected, based on this rhetoric,
groups that invest time and resources on democratic and representative structures do not gain
more access to the Commission, which contrasts with previous research focused on European
associations (Albareda and Braun, 2019). Hence, the Commission has not yet put into practice
the ‘privileged partnership’ arrangement with interest groups on the basis of representativeness
criteria (European Commission, 2001; Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2014, p. 135). In contrast, the
results indicate that the Commission mostly values efficient and professionalized groups that are
able to efficiently respond to public officials’ demands, and provide them with valuable policy
expertise (see also Klüver, 2012). In line with Majone’s (1999) proposal, the EU’s main concern
appears to be output legitimacy, which it seeks to obtain through technocratic principles and
prioritizing interactions with professionalized groups.
From an interest groups perspective, these results suggest that the inefficiency costs related to
member involvement come at a price of lower reactivity at the EU level (Hollman, 2018) and nega-
tively affects access to administrative venues (Willems, 2020). In other words, for groups that enjoy
high levels of access, maintainingmember involvementmight be very challenging, as it is rather costly
and time-consuming, and might reduce their decision-making speed. What is more, groups that have
complex organizational structures that combine member involvement and organizational capacity,
and thus can offer a wider range of policy goods and provide them in an efficient manner, do not see
any benefit in terms of more access to public officials. Thus, what matters for groups aiming to gain
more meetings with Commission officials is to invest in professionalized structures that generate
expertise and facilitate efficient policy responses to public officials’ demands.
According to these findings, the interaction between interest groups and EU public officials is
biased in favor of groups that may not be organizationally equipped to talk on behalf of their
constituency, thus decreasing the input legitimacy of the EU governance system (Kröger,
2014). This might be problematic from a democratic perspective as ‘interest groups may be more
willing to listen to the arguments of policymakers than represent the interests of their members’
(Berkhout et al., 2017, p. 1110; see also Kröger, 2016, p. 17). At a general level, these findings also
raise the important question of whether Commission officials, and the EUmore broadly, are active
enough in reaching out to groups that make big efforts to involve and represent their constituency.
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